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With more and more jobs moving overseas, there has been rising concern over the ability of 
the U.S. to remain competitive in the global economy.  In 2006, a committee from the National 
Academy of Sciences found a common “disturbing picture” across a multitude of industries, 
specifically, “a recurring pattern of abundant short-term thinking and insufficient long-term 
investment.” Key among their recommendations was to “strengthen the nation’s traditional 
commitment to long-term basic research that has the potential to maintain… the flow of new 
ideas that fuel the economy”(NationalAcademies, 2006). 
The committee’s recommendations are not surprising. In the earlier part of the 20th century, 
much R&D was still housed within corporate laboratories such as Bell Laboratories, GE 
Research, and Xerox Parc. In the 80s and 90s, with the rise of industrial clusters around Rt. 128 
and Silicon Valley, research emerged suggesting key advantages to networked small and 
medium sized enterprises. Such enterprises were shown to be able to react more quickly to 
changing business environments, and to be more innovative than their larger, slower-moving 
counterparts. Today, many large firms outsource their innovation needs to universities and small 
firms through technology alliances and acquisitions. This industrial model may, however, have 
disadvantages for long-term innovation. Recent studies have demonstrated challenges in this new 
environment in the alignment of firm incentives (Casadesus-Masanell and Yoffie, 2005), in 
coordination across firms (Iansiti and Levien, 2004), and, in particular, in supporting long-term 
research (Macher et al., 2000). Critical will be understanding to what extent and in what form 
government policies may be necessary to support long-term innovation in this new environment. 
To shed insights into this question, this study focuses on the Defense Advance Research 
Projects Association (DARPA) – a pioneer of the methods used by the U.S. developmental 
network state (Block, 2007) and one of the agencies to achieve some of the most striking early 
successes in technology development. Several factors make today a particularly interesting time 
to study DARPA.  First, while DARPA has historically enjoyed significant success in 
introducing and commercializing new technologies, DARPA has under the directorship of Tony 
Tether (2001-2008) undergone momentous changes, which have faced significant criticism from 
the academic computing community. Given the shift of DARPA funding under Tether away 
from academia to established industry vendors, this criticism is not surprising. Second, leading 
up to this shift within DARPA, there have been significant changes in the industry structure, 
market structure, and R&D structure in computing.  Thus, the changes within DARPA may be a 
necessary adjustment to changes in the computing industry and its innovation ecosystem. Finally, 
in the last decade a wealth of organizations have sprung up copying DARPA, aimed at 
technology development for other communities, outside the Department of Defense.  Examples 
include Advanced Research and Development Activity (ARDA, 1998) and IARPA (2006) for 
the intelligence community, HSARPA (2002) for homeland security, and ARPA-E (2007) for the 
Department of Energy.  With these recent developments, it seems imperative to look at the 
processes by which DARPA, historically, has encouraged new technology developments; what, 
over the years, about DARPA has changed and what has remained constant; and, most 
importantly, how DARPA’s processes are working in today’s innovation ecosystem. 
To understand the processes by which DARPA influences innovation and how these 
processes may weather shifts in the external political, industrial, and technical environment, I 
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conduct a case study of DARPA’s Microsystems Technology Office pre- (1992-2001) and post- 
(2001-2008) when Tony Tether took office in 2001. In executing the study, I triangulate 
participant observation, qualitative interview data, archival data, and bibliometric data to provide 
a holistic view of the forces driving technological change. The heart of my results draw from 50 
semi-structured interviews with scientists and technologists (including DARPA program 
managers) involved in the development of technologies also funded by DARPA’s Microsystems 
Technology Office between 1992 and 2008.  I identified key scientists and technologists in this 
technical area through a snowball effect based on names mentioned in early interviews and in 
news documents.  I cross-checked this list and identified additional DARPA program mangers 
involved in funding these technologies using DARPA’s archives for the period.  All together, I 
executed the interviews so as to ensure that they included (1) DARPA program managers from 
both before and after Tony Tether took the directorship in 2001, and (2) a representative cross-
section of scientists and technologists from within academic institutions, start-ups, and the five 
established microprocessor vendors – Intel, AMD, IBM, HP, and Sun. I also asked each 
respondent to provide an up-to-date biography and CV, including a list of all of their publications 
and patents to-date in their career.  I use these individual CVs to understand each interviewee’s 
bibliometric record, as well as their co-patenting and co-publishing with other scientists. 
The study has three main findings: First, DARPA’s adaptability to changing political, 
environmental, and technical times is a critical, historically repeated capability enabled by the 
structure of the organization. Second, throughout organizational changes in DARPA, DARPA 
program managers continue to use the same five processes to seed and encourage new 
technology trajectories with the academic and industrial communities. These processes consist of 
(1) identifying technology directions by bringing together elite researchers in formal and 
informal brainstorming sessions, (2) gathering momentum around key ideas by providing seed 
funding to disparate researchers working on similar projects, (3) disseminating knowledge and 
creating community by forcing funded researchers to present their results to each other in 
workshops, (4) acting as third party validation of new technology directions to latter-stage 
funding agencies (like NSF) and to industry, and (5) not sustaining the technology. Third, 
although the recent shift in the focus of DARPA’s efforts has received significant criticism from 
the academic community, DARPA may be effectively (1) narrowing the valley of death, (2) 
coordinating innovation within a vertically fragmented industry, and (3) influencing technology 
development to still serve military needs despite primary demand for computing having moved 
into commercial applications.  This “new DARPA” may, however, leave the U.S. technology 
pipeline without new sources of innovation. 
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